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POIRIER V. TOWN OF PLYMOUTH, 

THE HIDDEN DEFECT RULE, AND 





I. THE POIRIER CASE 
Francis Poirier, while employed by an independent contractor, 
suffered severe injuries when he fell from a water tower ladder 
owned by the defendant, town of Plymouth. The town of Ply­
mouth had engaged the contractor to paint the tower. The accident 
occurred when the ladder on which plaintiff was standing sprang 
away from the side of the tower and threw him to the ground. 1 
Poirier alleged that there was a hidden defect in a bolt which sec­
ured the ladder to the tower. He claimed that this defective bolt 
sheared and caused the ladder to catapult him from the tower re­
sulting in his personal injuries. 2 
At trial defendant challenged, in a motion for a directed ver­
dict, the sufficiency of plaintiff's proof of a hidden defec_t. 3 The 
judge denied the motion and instructed the jury that defendant 
owed plaintiff the same duty it owed its own employees4-to dis­
1. Poirier v. Town of Plymouth, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 100, 100, 372 N.E.2d 212, 
216 (1978). "The plaintiff was climbing the tank on a stationary ladder affixed to one 
of [the tank's] supporting legs and was thrown about thirty-five feet to the ground 
while attempting to continue his climb by going up onto a second ladder suspended 
from the top of the tank." 
2. The plaintiff's co-worker testified at trial that he had returned to the accident 
site later in the day and discovered part of a bolt in the grass beneath the ladders. 
The defendant insisted that it was "sheer guesswork" to conclude that the broken 
bolt had ever connected the ladders. If the ladders were connected by the bolt, it 
was "mere conjecture" that it had broken at the time of plaintiff's ascent. Id. at 103, 
372 N.E.2d at 218. 
3. The plaintiff introduced evidence that the two ladders were capable of being 
bolted together, that defendant had not followed standards promulgated by the 
American Water Works Association for the inspection and repair of storage tanks, and 
that plaintiff had not been contributorily negligent in climbing the ladders. Id. at 
104-05,372 N.E.2d at 218, 221. 
4. The plaintiff's recovery was not barred by the Massachusetts Workman's 
Compensation Act. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152 (West 1976). Section 15 of the Act 
provides that when an employee is injured under circumstances creating a legal lia­
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close hidden or concealed defects on the premises of which it was 
aware or should have been aware through the use of reasonable 
care. These instructions restated a well-settled rule of law in Mas­
sachusetts, the hidden defect rule. 5 The jury awarded the plaintiff 
a $60,000 verdict. On appeal, the verdict was set aside and judg­
ment awarded to the defendant on the ground that plaintiff's pro­
duction of proof was insufficient. 6 
In Poirier v. Town of Plymouth, 7 the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court unanimously reversed, holding that the evidence 
reasonably warranted a jury finding that a hidden defect existed8 
and that the defendant failed to warn the plaintiff of the defect. 
Thus, the jury verdict was reinstated. 9 The court went on to 
abolish the hidden defect rule. A plaintiff no longer has the burden 
of establishing that his injury was the result of a hidden defect of 
which the landowner-defendant was aware or should have been 
aware of through the exercise of reasonable care. 10 
bility in some person other than his own employer, the employee may bring a cause 
of action for negligence. At trial, the defendant maintained that he was a "common 
employer" and was therefore immune from tort suit under Brown v. Marr Equip. 
Corp., 355 Mass. 724,247 N.E.2d 352 (1969). In part three of the opinion, the Poirier 
court refused to apply the common employment doctrine. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 152, § 15 (West Supp. 1978), was amended by 1971 Mass. Acts ch. 941, § 1, which 
abolished the common employment doctrine. Poirier v. Town of Plymouth, 78 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 100, 113 n.4, 372 N.E.2d 212, 222 n.4 (1978). 
5. Poirier v. Town of Plymouth, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 100, 105, 372 N.E.2d 212, 
218 (1978). The jury charge was entirely consistent with the standard of care im­
posed by Afienko v. Harvard Club of Boston, 365 Mass. 320,327-28,312 N.E.2d 196, 
202 (1974). The Afienko doctrine is synonymous with the hidden defect rule. The 
overruled doctrine was not of recent origin; it was developing as early as 1864. Snow 
v. Housatonic R.R., 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 441, 446 (1864). 
6. Poirier v. Town of Plymouth, 76 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1174,357 N.E.2d 
336 (1976). The court found that "[wlhen the evidence tends equally to sustain 
either of two inconsistent propositions, neither of them can be said to have been 
established by legitimate proof. A verdict in favor of the party bound to maintain one 
of those propositions against the other is necessarily wrong." rd. at 1180, 357 N.E.2d 
at 339 (citing Smith v. First Nat'l Bank, 99 Mass. 605, 612 (1868)). 
7. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 100,372 N.E.2d 212 (1978). Reasoning for the reversal was 
divided (3-3-1) on two grounds. See note 10 infra. 
8. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 112, 372 N.E.2d at 221. 
9. rd. at 116,372 N.E.2d at 223. 
10. Justice Liacos, speaking for Justice Kaplan and Justice Abrams, held that 
plaintiff had met his burden by proving a hidden defect existed and, additionally, 
that the prior case law should be overruled. rd. at 101, 372 N.E.2d at 217. Justice 
Quirico, joined by Chief Justice Hennessey and Justice Wilkins, concurred in the 
result, but reversed on the ground that plaintiff had met his burden. rd. at 128, 372 
N.E.2d at 228. Justice Braucher joined the court in overruling the Afienko doctrine. 
rd. at 129,372 N.E.2d at 228. 
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The court, in overturning the hidden defect rule, established 
that the duty owed by a property owner to an employee of an 
independent contractor is the same duty owed to all other persons 
lawfully on the premises. 11 Thus, Poirier substitutes the standard of 
ordinary care under all circumstancesI2 in place of the hidden de­
fect rule. 
This article will explore the policies behind both the hidden 
defect rule and the shift to the ordinary care standard. The scope 
of the article will then expand beyond the confines of the Poirier 
case to note recent trends in substantive tort law and the 
methodology used by the Supreme Judicial Court and the legisla­
ture to effect private law reform in Massachusetts. Finally, drawing 
from methods used by both the judicial and legislative branches in 
recent reforms, the article will describe a new model for 
legislative-judicial interaction in private law reform. 
II. HIDDEN DEFECT-A RULE WITHOUT A REASON 
With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, courts reasoned 
that imposing liability on young enterprises engaged in new and 
innovative technologies would discourage commercial and industrial 
activity.13 As a consequence, common law doctrines evolved to in­
sulate commercial and industrial enterprises from liability.14 
At early common law, the only duty of care a Massachusetts 
employer owed his employee was to warn him of hidden dangers 
which the employee could not discover by reasonable inspection. IS 
11. Id. at 127,372 N.E.2d at 227. 
12. The ordinary care standard in Massachusetts was first defined by Chief Jus­
tice Shaw in Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850), "as that kind and 
degree of care, which prudent and cautious men would use, such as required by the 
exigency of the case, and such as is necessary to guard against probable danger." Id. 
at 294. 
13. James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 
57 YALE L.J. 549,549 (1948). 
14. One commentator has recognized an additional explanation for the trend. 
"American judges of the Nineteenth Century were of a different breed. Many were 
politicians; all were living in a new land crying for exploitation; industrialists were 
often dominant figures in society; country gentlemen were rarely judges in industrial 
states." Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 
1172, 1175-76 (1952). 
15. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 116,372 N.E.2d at 223. See Hannon v. Hayes-Bickford 
Lunch Sys. Inc., 336 Mass. 268, 272, 145 N.E.2d 191, 193 (1957), and cases cited 
therein. For an early case involving an independent contractor, see Pettingill v. 
William Porter & Son, Inc., 219 Mass. 347, 107 N.E. 269 (1914) (independent con­
tractor's employee assumes the same risks as a regular employee, but employer is 
bound to warn him of hidden dangers which he cannot reasonably discover). 
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The employee assumed all obvious risks, even if he failed to ap­
preciate the particular danger involved. 16 Thus, at common law an 
employer did not have to bear the economic burden of eliminating 
obvious hazards. 17 
The employee, on the other hand, had to meet an oppressive 
burden in proving the employer's negligence. The hidden defect 
rule required the employee to prove that the defect was not readily 
discoverable by the employee, and that the employer failed to dis­
close the existence of a concealed defect of which he was aware or 
should have been aware by conducting a reasonable inspection. 18 
Thus, while the plaintiff-employee went about proving he was un­
able to discover the defect, he had to proceed cautiously lest he 
prove too much. The plaintiff who too rigorously argued that the 
defect was hidden would prove himself out of court because the 
employer could then claim that the defect was not discoverable. 
Only in a narrow range of factual situations could the plaintiff suc­
cessfully prove the danger to be "hidden" and still sustain the re­
quired burden of proof for employer negligence. 
If plaintiff did establish employer negligence, a number of de­
fenses, including assumption of risk,19 the fellow servant doc­
trine,20 and contributory negligence21 normally barred any recov­
ery. It was because of this so-called "unholy trinity"22 of defenses 
16. O'Maley v. South Boston Gaslight Co., 158 Mass. 135, 137, 32 N.E. 1119, 
U20 (1893). 
17. The enterprise-protecting policy of the Massachusetts court is revealed in 
the following passage: "It would be unreasonable to attempt to require every one 
hiring laborers to have the safest place and the best machinery possible for carrying 
on its business." Id. at 137, 32 N.E. at 1120. 
18. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 108 n.l, 372 N.E.2d at 220 n.1. 
19. An employer was not liable if the servant voluntarily encountered a known 
risk. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (4th ed. 1971). See, e.g., Donahue v. 
Washburn & Moen Mfg. Co., 169 Mass. 574, 487 N.E. 842 (1897); Fitzgerald v. Con­
necticut River Paper Co., 115 Mass. 155,29 N.E. 464 (1891). 
20. The fellow servant rule holds that an employer is not liable for injuries 
caused solely by the negligence of a fellow employee. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 
80. See, e.g., Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). This defense 
was abolished by the Massachusetts Employer's Liability Act as noted in O'Maley v. 
South Boston Gaslight Co., 158 Mass. 135, 136,32 N.E. lU9, 1120 (1893). 
21. "Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contribut­
ing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to 
which he is required to conform for his own protection." W. PROSSER, supra note 19, 
§ 65, at 416. See Tenanty v. Boston Mfg. Co., 170 Mass. 323, 49 N.E. 654 (1898). 
22. The practical effect of the three defenses was to relieve the employer of all 
liability, even though he failed to adequately protect his employees. See W. PROS­
SER, supra note 19, § 80, at 526-27. 
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that Massachusetts enacted an employer liability act23 and a work­
man's compensation act. 24 
In Poirier, the court re-examined the common law evolution of 
the hidden defect rule and found it to be a corollary of the doctrine 
of assumption of the risk. 25 The barrier to employee recovery 
erected by the hidden defect rule was "almost the exact antithesis 
of the philosophy" underlying the workman's compensation laws. 26 
The lack of a public policy reason to retain the rule,27 combined 
with the modern philosophy underlying workmen's compensation 
laws, led to abrogation of the hidden defect rule. 28 As a result of 
Poirier, industry is now forced to assume the burden of paying all 
damages resulting from its breach of the duty of ordinary care, re­
gardless of the status of the injured person. 
In addition to harmonizing the law governing recovery by the 
employee of an independent contractor with the modern view of 
compensation for work related injuries, Poirier further broadens the 
application of the ordinary care standard. 29 Several years earlier, 
the court abandoned status distinctions which defined the duty of 
care landowners owed to plaintiffs.30 The court in Mounsey v. 
23. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 153 (West 1958). 
24. The Workman's Compensation Act was passed in response to strong public 
sentiment that tort remedies afforded at common law and under the Employer's Lia­
bility Act were inadequate. Greem v. Cohen, 298 Mass. 439, 443, 11 N.E.2d 492, 494 
(1937). The Workman's Compensation Act abolished all three defenses. The Em­
ployer's Liability Act was retained after the enactment of the compensation law to 
preserve the common law rights of workers not covered by it. 
25. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 124,372 N.E.2d at 226. 
26. [d. at 123,372 N.E.2d at 226 (citing 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 21.4, at 1176 (1956)). 
27. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 118,372 N.E.2d at 224. 
28. [d. at 123, 372 N.E.2d at 226. 
29. Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973). Prior to the 
Mounsey decision, common law distinctions between the duty of care owed by a 
land occupier to trespassers, licensees, and invitees were in effect in Massachusetts. 
[d. at 701, 297 N.E.2d at 51. The court retained the distinction as to the duty owed 
by a land occupier to trespassers: no general duty except to avoid intentionally harm­
ing him. But see Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 696, 308 N.E.2d 467 
(1974) (reasonable care if trespasser helplessly trapped on the premises and owner 
has knowledge). Under Mounsey, however, anyone lawfully on the premises is owed 
a duty of reasonable care under all circumstances. Accord, King v. G & M Realty Corp., 
77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2372, 370 N.E.2d 413 (1977) (held landlord owes tenant a duty of 
reasonable care in maintaining common areas); Lindsey v. Massios, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
381, 360 N.E.2d 631 (1977) (abolished common law rule which had held no duty 
owed by landlord to maintain common area for tenant's visitors). 
30. The court stated, "Those of us who join in this part of the opinion feel that 
[the general negligence rule] is the appropriate one to be followed consistently with 
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Ellard31 decreed, "We no longer follow the common law distinction 
between licensees and invitees and, instead, create a common duty 
of reasonable care which the occupier owes to all lawful visitors. "32 
The Poirier court applied the following rationale: 
The problem of allocating the costs and risks of human Injury is 
far too complex to be decided solely by the status of the entrant, 
especially where the status question often prevents the jury from 
ever determining the fundamental question whether the defen­
dant has acted reasonably in light of all the circumstances in the 
particular case. 33 
Abandonment of status distinctions in tort law represents the better 
view,34 as well as the currently emerging trend, even though only 
a minority of American jurisdictions have adopted it. 35 
the views expressed in Mounsey and its progeny." 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 127, 372 
N.E.2d at 227-28. 
31. 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973). 
32. Id. at 707, 297 N.E.2d at 51. 
33. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 120, 372 N.E.2d at 224-25; 363 Mass. at 707, 297 
N.E.2d at 51. 
34. Many writers approved Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 
70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), in which the California court first rejected the common law 
status distinctions between trespassers, licensees, and invitees. See Ursin, Strict 
Liability for Defective Business Premises-One Step Beyond Rowland and Green­
mann, 22 UCLA L. REV. 820 (1975); Comment, Torts-Occupier's Liability-In­
vitee, Licensee, and Trespasser Distinction Abolished in California, 23 ARK. L. REV. 
153 (1969); Comment, Torts-Negligence-Premises Liability: The Foreseeable 
Emergence of the Community Standard, 51 DEN. L.J. 145 (1974); Comment, Torts 
-Occupier of Land Held to Owe Duty of Ordinaf"!/ Care to All Entrants, 44 N.Y. U.L. 
REV. 426 (1969); Note, A Reexamination of the Land Possessor's Duty to Trespas­
sers, Licensees and Invitees, 14 S.D.L. REV. 332 (1969). 
35. Jurisdictions abandoning the status of trespasser, licensee, and invitee as 
the conclusive factor in determining the duty of care owed to entrants upon land 
include the District of Columbia, Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 
(D.C. Cir. 1972), California, Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 
Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), Colorado, Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 
P.2d 308 (1971), Hawaii, Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 
452 P.2d 445 (1969), New York, Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 
N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976), and Rhode Island, Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 RI. 
294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975). 
Jurisdictions abolishing the distinctions between invitees and licensees, but 
maintaining the rule as to trespassers include Massachusetts, Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 
Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973), Minnesota, Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 
N.W.2d 639 (1972), and Wisconsin, Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 
N.W.2d 1 (1975). Two jurisdictions have done so by statute. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
52-557a (Supp. 1977); Occupiers Liability Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957) (Eng­
land). 
The United States Supreme Court refused to apply the common law classifica­
tion system in admiralty cases. The Court held that a shipowner owed a duty of 
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III. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF POIRIER 
As a practical matter, overruling the hidden defect rule will 
expand landowner liability for accidents occurring on their premises. 
More plaintiffs, specifically more employees of independent contrac­
tors, will be able to sustain the less stringent burden of proof and 
recover damages for their injuries. 36 
The burden of proof under the hidden defect rule rested with 
the plaintiff-employee,37 who had to show that the defect was not 
discoverable by him, while at the same time demonstrating that his 
employer knew or should have known of the defect. 38 This burden 
of proof protected defendant-landowners by enabling them to suc­
cessfully move for a dismissal, directed verdict, or judgment not­
withstanding the verdict when the plaintiff failed to allege and pro­
duce evidence from which a jury could find a hidden defect. 39 
These dispositions judicially foreclose the liability issue. After 
Poirier, however, most claims will not be resolved unless the jury 
reaches the more important question: the reasonableness of the de­
fendant's conduct in light of all the facts and circumstances of the 
case. 40 By removing plaintiff's onerous burden of proof, the court 
has expanded landowner liability within the negligence frame­
work. 41 The change does not make the landowner an insurer but 
does allow his conduct to be frequently subjected to close scru­
tiny by the finder of fact.42 In light of the fact that, statistically, 
juries render verdicts for plaintiffs in two-thirds to three-quarters of 
reasonable care to anyone on board. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale TransatIan­
tique,358 U.S. 625 (1959). 
36. The court characterized the obstacles to proving that a defect or danger was 
hidden as substantial. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 118, 372 N.E.2d at 224. 
37. Id. at 122 n.8, 372 N.E.2d at 225 n.8. 
38. Id. at 118, 372 N.E.2d at 224. 
39. See Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 103-04 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). In Soares v. Lakeville Baseball Camp, Inc., 76 Mass. Adv. Sh. 681, 682, 343 
N.E.2d 840, 841 (1976), the court called attention to the reasons contained in MASS. 
R. CIV. P. 50(a) for denying motions for directed verdicts at the close of the plaintiff's 
case and at the close of all the evidence. The court seemed to favor the granting of a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial under MASS. R. CIV. 
P. 50(b) in cases where the evidence does not establish liability. 
40. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 120, 372 N.E.2d at 224-25. Accord, Mile High Fence 
Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537,542,489 P.2d 308, 311-12 (1971). 
41. See Comment, Return to Anonymous: The Dying Concept of Fault, 25 
EMORY L.J. 163, 185-86 (1976). 
42. Liability could be avoided also by the third party employer placing an ex­
culpatory clause in his agreement with the independent contractor. The clause may 
require that a safety inspection of the landowner's premises be made and that, in the 
event an employee of the independent contractor is injured, the landowner will not 
be held liable. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 129,372 N.E.2d at 228 (Braucher, J., concurring). 
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all negligence cases that survive a motion for directed verdict, 43 
Poirier will directly result in more verdicts in favor of plaintiffs. 
The Poirier court properly reasoned that the hidden defect 
rule obscured rather than illuminated the factors which should 
govern the allocation of risk. Now, under Poirier, juries will allo­
cate the risk of work related injury by determining whether the 
defendant, in the management of his premises, has breached his 
duty of care under the reasonable person standard. 44 Juries will 
determine a landowner's liability according to the prevailing· 
standard of reasonable conduct. 45 Because of the flexibility of this 
standard, a substantial danger exists that juries will find liability 
46when landowners have not breached their duty of care. In 
Poirier, for example, the three judges on the Massachusetts Court of 
Appeals agreed that plaintiff had failed to prove negligence,47 and 
yet the jury found for the plaintiff. 
DuPont v. Mount Hope Machinery CO.48 illustrates the poten­
43. See James, Accident Liability: Some Wartime Developments, 55 YALE L.J. 
365, 374 (1946). 
44. In this context, some of the factors that will be taken into account in deter­
mining what constitutes "reasonable care in all the circumstances" include the in­
herent dangers in the job, whether any warning was given, the authorization of the 
employee to be on a certain part of the premises, the experience of the employee in 
performing his job, the expense of avoiding the risk, the likelihood of injury, the 
seriousness of the injury if one was to occur, and the chances that future harm will 
be prevented. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 105-06 (D.C. Cir. 
1972); Mounsey, 363 Mass. at 708, 297 N.E.2d at 52. 
45. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Mas­
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Mounsey, relied heavily on Judge Bazelon's 
opinion in Smith. Judge .Bazelon, cited in Mounsey, said, "[The reasonable person 
standard] contains the flexibility necessary to allow the jury to take account of the 
infinite variety of fact situations ... and the balance of values which determines the 
allocation of the costs and risks of human injury." 469 F.2d at 105. 
46. For a Massachusetts case in which the jury found for plaintiff, when it ap­
peared from the facts that defendant was not negligent, see Vance v. Wayside Inn, 
Inc., 335 Mass. 617,141 N.E.2d 365 (1957). Cf. Rose v. Melody Lane of Wilshire, 39 
Cal. 2d 481, 247 P.2d 335 (1952) (defendant found negligent even though defect in 
barstool that collapsed could not have been found with a microscope). 
47. We are of the opinion that the evidence was insufficient to warrant 
a finding that any interconnection between the two ladders was designed 
or intended to prevent what happened in this case. In short, the plaintiff 
failed to sustain his burden of introducing evidence sufficient to warrant 
a finding of a defect on the defendants premises. 
Poirier v. Town of Plymouth, 76 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1174, 1180,357 N.E.2d 336, 
339 (1976). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated, "It is not the role of an 
appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder when reasonable 
conclusions based on reasonable inferences have been made." 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
108,372 N.E.2d at 220. 
48. 75 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1365,338 N.E.2d 356 (1975). 
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tial jury abuse problem under the Poirier standard of care. In Du­
Pont an elevator door that plaintiff, an employee of an independent 
contractor, and his foreman raised and temporarily secured in place 
fell and injured the plaintiff. The jury rendered a verdict against 
the owner of the premises on the ground that he had breached his 
duty to warn the plaintiff of a hidden defect. The Massachusetts 
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court erred in its denial of 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The facts in DuPont indi­
cated that it was plaintiff or his foreman, rather than the land­
owner, who failed to exercise due care, yet the jury found a way to 
compensate the plaintiff. Furthermore, this verdict was rendered 
under the hidden defect rule, which had been characterized by the 
Poirier court as putting a substantial obstacle to recovery in the 
path of the injured employee. 49 DuPont illustrates the tendency of 
juries to allow recovery for work related injury despite an overly 
restrictive common law rule. Under the flexible reasonable person 
standard, juries can be more liberal in finding liability. 
The potential extent of jury abuse is not, however, a persua­
sive argument for retaining an anachronistic rule of law. No doubt, 
prior to Poirier some judges had abused their discretion by taking 
landowner liability cases from the jury. The restrictive hidden de­
fect rule was fraught with opportunities for judicial foreclosure of 
the liability issue. Poirier cures this deficiency, but at the same 
time unleashes the tendency of juries to compensate injured plain­
tiffs even though the defendant was in no way responsible for the 
injury. The effects of this tendency can be tempered by judicial 
dispositions in favor of defendants. If wisely used under the Poirier 
standard, the motion to dismiss, directed verdict, and judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict can become methods of correcting 
rather than creating injustice. The judiciary will have to strike the 
proper balance between the rights of plaintiffs who justly deserve 
to recover and the countervailing rights of defendants who are not 
at fault and who need to be insulated from an arbitrary imposition 
of liability. 
For the practitioner, Poirier's significance lies in the extended 
application of the Mounsey principle. Artificial status distinctions in 
tort continue to give way to the more universal standard of ordi­
nary care. The court has clearly demonstrated its willingness to 
extend the Mounsey doctrine by analogy. 50 
49. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 118, 372 N.E.2d at 224. 
50. In Poirier, King v. G & M Realty Corp., 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2372, 370 
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An imaginative argument extending the Mounsey doctrine was 
advanced in Paduano v. Tefft. 51 Counsel urged the court to extend 
Mounsey to eliminate the distinction between guest passengers and 
passengers for hire in actions to enforce a motor vehicle operator's 
duty of care. The old rule had already been changed by a statute, 
but the statute was given only prospective effect. 52 The court held 
that the statute controlled because the accident occurred after the 
statute's effective date. The court went on to state that the acci­
dent's timing excluded "any possibility that might otherwise exist 
for bringing the Mounsey principle to bear. ... "53 The court, al­
though never conceding that it would apply the Mounsey principle 
in the guest statute context, was clearly tempted to apply Mounsey 
to abrogate this status distinction. 
In DiMarzo v. S & P Realty Corp.,54 defendant appealed an 
evidentiary question in an action involving the negligent repair of 
leased premises. The suit was brought by an employee of a tenant 
at will against his employer's landlord. The court, while deciding 
the case on other grounds, intimated that it could have applied the 
reasoning of Mounsey. "We might well be inclined toward a recon­
sideration of the rules of tort liability of the lessors under a tenancy 
at will if the decision in this case required it. "55 Again, in M ar­
karian v. Simonian, 56 the court said, "In light of this conclusion, 
we need not take the opportunity to overrule Chelefou . ... Nor, 
need we consider the impact of Mounsey v. Ellard."57 These cases 
N.E.2d 413 (1977), and Lindsey v. Massios, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 381, 360 N.E.2d 631 
(1977), the court used the Mounsey principal as its primary rational for rejecting du­
ality of approach pertaining to duty of care. 
51. 76 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1744,1744,351 N.E.2d 210, 211 (1976). 
52. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85L (West 1974). "This act shall take 
effect on January the first, nineteen hundred and seventy-two and shall apply only to 
causes of action arising after said date." 76 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1745, 351 N.E.2d at 211 
(quoting 1971 Mass. Acts ch. 865, § 2). Plaintiff's cause of action arose on August 13, 
1970. 
53. [d. 
54. 364 Mass. 510, 306 N.E.2d 432 (1974). 
55. [d. at 514, 306 N.E.2d at 434. 
56. 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2386, 369 N.E.2d 718 (1977). 
57. [d. at 2393, 369 N.E.2d at 722 (citations omitted). See Chelefou v. 
Springfield Inst. for Sav., 297 Mass. 236, 8 N.E.2d 769 (1937). Chelefou held that if 
the injury which takes place was not a forseeable harm within the purposes of an 
agreement to repair and was not the kind of risk which the landlord would be re­
quired to anticipate in undertaking the repair no liability can be found. The Mar­
karian court distinguished Chelefou and ordered a new trial after finding that a di­
rected verdict for defendant had been improperly granted. 
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indicate the breadth of circumstances in which the Mounsey prin­
ciple may apply. Plaintiff's counsel may use the court's favorable 
disposition toward this emerging doctrine to their client's advan­
tage. 
IV. SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW POLICY 
During the last two decades, in formulating common law tort 
doctrine, courts have pursued two major goals-accident reduction 
and risk distribution. 58 In striving for these two goals, courts seek 
to provide incentives that will eliminate many accidents alto­
gether,59 then spread the cost of the remaining injuries over a 
large number of persons. 60 
The first goal, accident reduction, will be furthered by abroga­
tion of the rule because more injured plaintiffs will recover under 
Poirier. 61 This will provide a financial incentive for accident cost 
reduction. Imposing greater liability on landowners will prompt 
them to more thoroughly consider higher potential accident costs 
in maintaining their premises. 62 Potential tort liability should en­
courage landowners to discover dangerous defects on their prem­
ises, to evaluate various means of eliminating them, and to warn 
potential victims. Thus, the risk has been shifted to the party who 
is in the best position to make the premises safe. 
Leaving the accident loss on the plaintiff in the independent 
contractor setting will not reduce accident costs. First, unlike the 
regular employee, the independent contractor's employee does not 
normally have an effective voice in determining the safety of his 
58. Cooperrider, A Comment on the Law of Torts, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1291 
(1958). Twenty years ago Professor Cooperrider wrote in a review of F. HARPER & F. 
JAMES, supra note 26, "As I read their book these principles, which are for them 
[Harper and James] basic, can be summarized as two slogans, 'Let All Accident 
Victims Be Compensated,' and 'Let The Loss Be Spread.''' Cooperrider, sup,.a at 
1299. Courts have always tried to prevent the occurrence of accidents. One of the 
overriding principles in negligence law is to make individuals act in a safe and rea­
sonable manner towards each other. 
59. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). 
60. The court merely concluded that abrogation of the rule "would require the 
property owner to take those steps to prevent injury that are reasonable and appro­
priate under all the circumstances." 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 127,372 N.E.2d at 227. 
61. The court recognized that classifying the Afienko doctrine as a standard of 
care obscured the fact that, in practice, it operated as a defense. Id. at 121-22, 372 
N.E.2d at 225. 
62. See Ursin, supra note 34, at 829. Insurance companies will encourage land­
owners to minimize all risks. 
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working environment. Normally, the pressures of the competitive 
market force the independent contractor to take the premises as he 
finds them. Therefore, the independent contractor's employees are 
not in a position to eliminate even the obvious defects they dis­
cover on the job. Furthermore, since an independent contractor's 
employee works in unfamiliar surroundings, he is more likely to 
have an accident. 63 
In Poirier, the plaintiff relied on the appearance of safety when 
he climbed the ladder. A regular employee might have been more 
familiar with the dangers involved and might have avoided the ac­
cident and the consequential injury costs. The higher risk of injury 
to the employee of an independent contractor makes a common law 
rule which imposes on a landowner the same duty of care toward 
the employee of an independent contractor and a regular employee 
anomalous. 64 
After accident reduction, the second goal courts pursue in 
formulating negligence policy is risk distribution. Achieving this 
goal spreads accident costs over the largest number of persons pos­
sible to minimize the cost impact on anyone individual,65 and 
favors compensation of victims as an end in itself. Strict liability for 
manufacturing defects66 and ultrahazardous activity,67 workman's 
compensation statutes,68 no-fault automobile insurance,69 and re­
cent proposals for a national health insurance system70 illustrate the 
trend toward shifting risk responsibilities to no-fault recovery sys­
63. See Power, It's Time to Bury the Borrowed Servant Doctrine, 17 ST. LOUIS 
V.L.]. 464 (1973). Not only are the surroundings in which the employee of an inde­
pendent contractor works unfamiliar, but often his reason for being on the premises 
is that something has gone wrong. For example, if the heating or air conditioning 
system on the premises fails, the independent contractor's employee must make the 
necessary repairs. This may require him to enter crawl spaces, utility rooms, or other 
parts of the premises where regular employees rarely venture. There may be defects 
in these areas which no one has reason to know of and, therefore, the independent 
contractor's employee will often be exposed to hazards that regular employees never 
encounter. 
64. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 31. 
65. See Calabresi, supra note 59, at 500-01. 
66. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.]. 1099, 1120-21 
( 1960). 
67. See Morris, supra note 14, at 1178. 
68. See Larson, The Nature and Origin of Workman's Compensation, 37 COR­
NELL L.Q. 206,209 (1952). 
69. See Linden, Is Tort Law Relevant to the Automobile Accident Compensa­
tion Problem? 47 TEX. L. REV. 1013, 1023 (1969). 
70. See Falk, National Health Insurance: A Review of Policies and Proposals, 
35 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 669, 670-71 (1970). 
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terns in which insurance provides most of the compensation. 71 
The Poirier court found that the hidden defect rule had 
obscured a proper allocation of such risks. 72 Implicitly the court 
recognized that without the rule more plaintiffs would recover and 
more enterprises would therefore insure. The court acknowledged 
work-related accidents as an inevitable cost of our economic system 
that must be distributed among the beneficiaries of the enter­
prise. 73 If the activity causing the loss is a business enterprise, 
then the cost of insurance or, alternatively, the payment of tort 
recoveries, will increase the cost of the goods or services produced 
by the enterprise. In the end, the cost increase is passed on to the 
enterprises' users or consumers. Distributing the cost of personal 
injury to an enterprise's ultimate beneficiaries spreads the cost 
thinly so that no one individual is inordinately burdened. 74 The 
Poirier decision has clearly shifted loss responsibility from an in­
ferior to a superior risk bearer. 
Insurance premium costs act as an additional incentive to 
landowners to make their premises safe, furthering the first policy 
goal of accident reduction. When making the premises safe costs 
less than liability insurance, landowners will presumably make 
their premises safe. Thus, attaining the goal of risk distribution can 
achieve the more desirable accident reduction goal. 
Employer-employee relationships, which are controlled by the 
Workman's Compensation Act, are not altered by the abrogation of 
the hidden defect rule. The increased workman's compensation in­
surance premiums paid by landowner-employers with high accident 
rates have already given these landowners some incentive to make 
their premises safe. 75 Poirier gives those landowners who employ 
independent contractors an additional cost incentive to make their 
premises safe. 76 Landowners and accident victims, as well as the 
71. For a historical account and coverage of the modem shift away from fault 
concepts in tort, see Comment, supra note 41. 
72. Id. 
73. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 123, 372 N.E.2d at 226. 
74. Morris, supra note 14, at 1178. 
75. "It is the general rule, supported by virtually all the cases ... , that insur­
ance rates are based upon benefits paid on the insured's behalf to his employees." 
12 W. SCHNEIDER, SCHNEIDER'S WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION § 2508 (3d ed. 1960). 
76. This incentive may be substantial. "[Lawyers] will also look for someone 
other than the immediate employer who can be sued in tort, to avoid the dollar 
limitation placed on Workman's Compensation, nonnally the exclusive remedy 
against the immediate employer." Brooks, Tort Liability of Owners and General 
Contractors for On-The-Job Injuries to Workmen, 13 UCLA L. REV. 99, 99 (1965). 
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general public, benefit from this decision because the law now ap­
proaches optimum risk distribution. 
V. JUDICIAL PROCESS AS A DECISIONMAKING TOOL 
The Poirier court'S willingness to overrule the hidden effect 
doctrine, rather than allow plaintiff recovery on the narrow ground 
that he had met his burden of proof, reflects a fundamental change 
in the court's philosophy of tort law. The court's decision to abro­
gate the hidden defect rule is not an isolated instance of judicial 
reform of the traditional limitations on tort recoveries. During the 
twenty-year period beginning in January 1948 and ending De­
cember 1967, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court overruled 
only two significant lines of tort precedent. 77 In the next ten years, 
the court overruled at least eighteen established precedents. 78 Ju­
77. Keyes v. Construction Servo Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960) 
(right of action exists for prenatal injuries); Kabatchnick V. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 
328 Mass. 341, 103 N.E.2d 692 (1952) (scope of action for deceit by "seller's talk" 
expanded). 
78. Recent significant changes in Massachusetts tort law include the following 
decisions: Dziokonski v. Babineau, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1759, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) 
(emotional distress with resulting physical injury compensable where parent wit­
nesses accident or comes on scene while child still there); Poirier, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 100, 372 N.E.2d at 212; King V. G & M Realty Corp., 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2372, 370 
N.E.2d 413 (1977) (held landlord o~es tenant a duty of reasonable care in maintain­
ing common areas); Whitney V. City of Worcester, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1713, 366 
N.E.2d 1210 (1977) (court will abolish governmental immunity in the next appro­
priate case, provided legislature does not act); Lindsey V. Massios, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
381, 360 N.E.2d 631 (1977) (abolished common law rule which had held no duty 
owed by landlord to maintain common area for tenant's visitors); Agis v. Howard 
Johnson Co., 76 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2346, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976) (one who by extreme 
and outrageous conduct causes severe emotional distress to another is liable even 
though no bodily harm may result); Lewis V. Lewis, 76 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1764, 351 
N.E.2d 526 (1976) (abrogation of interspousal immunity in motor vehicle negligence 
actions); Sorenson V. Sorenson, 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3662, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975) (abro­
gation of parental immunity to extent of liability insurance in motor vehicle cases); 
Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2326, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975) 
(viable fetus considered person under wrongful death statute); Pridgen v. Boston 
HollS. Auth., 74 Mass. 245, 308 N.E.2d 467 (1974) (landowner owes trespasser duty 
of reasonable care if trespasser helplessly trapped on the premises and owner has 
knowledge); Diaz v. Eli Lilly and Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973) (either 
spouse has claim for loss of consortium caused by third party negligence); Mounsey, 
363 Mass. at 693, 297 N.E.2d at 43 (abolished common law distinctions in duty of 
care owed to one lawfully on the premises); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 
363 Mass. 612, 296 N.E.2d 461 (1973) (no governmental immunity for maintaining 
private nuisance); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co., 362 Mass. 642, 289 N.E.2d 879 (1972) 
(shift burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 
284 N.E.2d 222 (1972) (wrongful death action held to be part of common law; statute 
of limitations tolled); George V. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 
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dicial reform of burdens of proof, broadened concepts of compens­
able injuries, abrogation of immunities, expanded duties of care, 
and new causes of action are hard evidence of a judicial activism 
based on policy rather than precedent. 
The extent of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's new 
activism may be appreciated by reference to the unique perspec­
tive of the federal district court in Massachusetts. When sitting in 
diversity jurisdiction the district court must apply the same sub­
stantive law,79 conflicts of law rules,80 and notions of public pol­
icy81 that the state court applies. If no state law is directly on 
point, the federal district court must determine how the state court 
of last resort would decide the case. This requires the federal 
court to examine state cases and, by analogy or implication, pre­
dict the state court's decision. 
A quarter of a century ago, Judge Wyzanski, writing for the 
Massachusetts federal district court in Pomerantz v. Clark,82 de­
scribed the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as follows: 
The eminence of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, an 
eminence not surpassed by any American tribunal, is in large 
measure due to its steadiness, learning and understanding of the 
durable values long prized in this community .... The emphasis 
is on precedent and adherence to the older ways, not on creat­
ing new causes of action or encouraging the use of novel judi­
cial remedies that have sprung up in less conservative com­
munities. 83 
In contrast, Judge Julian, writing for the district court, re­
cently refused to dismiss a claim of strict products liability,84 even 
though at the time the motion to dismiss was made no cause of 
action based on this theory existed in Massachusetts. 85 The district 
(1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress with resulting bodily 
harm); Colby v. Carney Hosp., 356 Mass. 527, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1969) (court will 
abrogate charitable immunity if legislature does not act); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 
Mass. 102,235 N.E.2d 793 (1968) (expanded physicians' duty of care). 
79. Erie RR v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
80. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
81. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). 
82. 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951). 
83. ld. at 346. 
84. The doctrine of strict liability is defined by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 402A (1965) which imposes liability on one who sells any product in a 
defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his prop­
erty. 
85. Calhoun v. General Motors Co., 4 MASS. LAw. WEEKLY 69 (1975). 
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court based its action on the possibility that the claim might be 
cognizable at the time of trial. Because Massachusetts had not ex­
pressly adopted or rejected strict products liability, the federal dis­
trict court, respecting the state court's propensity to adopt new 
law, would not dismiss the claim. Thus, the shift in the court's 
approach from staunch adherence to the principle of stare decisis to 
a broad-based policy-oriented activism has not gone unnoticed. 86 . 
Poirier also illustrates the decision-making methodology of the 
activist court. In Poirier, 87 as in M ounsey88 and Boston Housing 
Authority v. Hemmingway,89 prior case law was overruled and 
86. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's philosophy toward law reform 
is also evident in the following description of the activist court under Chief Justice 
Tauro (1970-1977): 
Early in his term as Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, Chief 
Justice Tauro directed his vast energies toward the modernization of the 
civil law of the Commonwealth-a subject described by one observer as "too 
long ... enmeshed in a morass of artificial, archaic, and anachronistic rules 
... a wasteland of mechanical legal rules." Addressing himself to the resolu­
tion of this problem, he wrote: 
"When dealing with a rule of law originally established by judicial deci­
sion I believe that its change, when required, should come by means of a 
judicial decision. In these circumstances, I do not believe that we should 
look to the Legislature for change. To do so is a distortion of the concept of 
judicial review whereby the legislature is invited, in effect, to reverse judi­
cial decisions. If the courts are in assent and maintain their rightful inde­
pendence and inherent powers within their proper sphere, they should not 
pass on to the Legislature the task of altering by statute the holdings of prior 
judicial decisions in nonstatutory matters. The mere passage of time does 
not shift the burden to the Legislature." 
This willingness to take a fresh look at the rationale and application of 
decisional law in the light of changing social and economic conditions be­
came the benchmark of Chief Justice Tauro's decisions. "Courts, especially 
courts of equity," he wrote, "should not be restricted to ... (a) fossilized ... 
concept of what the law is or should be. The cause of justice deserves a 
better fate." 
The Honorable G. Joseph Tauro: A Tribute, 61 MASS. L.Q. 19,21 (1977). 
Chief Justice Hennessey has written, "Precedent ... must be respected if it is 
good precedent, but it does not become good merely because it is petrified by many 
years of observance." 4 MASS. LAW. WEEKLY 196 (1975). It seems likely that tort 
precedents will continue to be scrutinized and overruled by the court. 
87. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 128, 372 N.E.2d at 228. (Quirico, J., concurring, with 
Hennessey, C.J. and Wilkins, J., joining). 
88. 363 Mass. at 710, 297 N.E.2d at 53 (Quirico, J., concurring in part and dis­
senting in part, with Reardon & Wilkins, JJ., joining). 
89. 363 Mass. 184, 203, 293 N.E.2d -831, 845 (1973) (Quirico, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, with whom Reardon & Wilkins, JJ., join). The court held 
that enforcement of the tenant's covenant to pay rent is dependent on the landlord's 
compliance with an implied warranty of habitability. The case overruled the doctrine 
of caveat emptor, as well as the common law doctrine of independent covenants 
between tenant and landlord. 
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broad new rules of law were promulgated which had application 
beyond the scope and necessity of the case before the court. In 
these cases, Justice Quirico concurred in the result but objected 
strongly to the practice of making new law not required by the case 
at bar. While courts have no duty to follow lines of precedent 
which are manifestly unjust, they must control in both frequency and 
scope their exercise of the overruling power. Adherence to prece­
dent should be the rule and not the exception. When overruling 
prior case law becomes necessary, judicial comment on fact pat­
terns not before the court can and should be avoided. 90 
The dangers inherent in the use of broad holdings-holdings 
which expand the scope of an opinion beyond the needs of the 
principal case-are described by Justice Quirico's concurring and 
dissenting opinion in Mounsey. He was "unable to agree with the 
use of the present case as the vehicle for the promulgation of such 
a broad new rule of law."91 According to Justice Quirico in both 
Mounsey and Poirier, prior case law was overruled without the 
benefit of briefing or argument by either party.92 Before an appel­
late court departs from established precedents, Justice Quirico feels 
that the court should require argument and briefs to fully illumi­
nate all aspects of its decision. 93 In cases like Poirier, Mounsey, and 
Hemmingway, the court ought to temper its activism by adopting 
Justice Quirico's stance and refraining from a sweeping re­
examination of well settled tort doctrine unless all parties are given 
notice of the court's intention to do so. Notice could easily be 
90. Pound, Defective Law-Its Cause and Remedy, N.Y. ST. B.A. BULL. 279, 
279-88 (1929). 
91. 363 Mass. at 713,297 N.E.2d at 55. 
92. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 128, 372 N.E.2d at 228; 363 Mass. at 717, 297 N.E.2d 
at 57. 
The briefs and oral arguments before this court did not concern themselves 
with such a rule. From that I think we may assume that the parties did not 
consider the case as involving the issue of extension of liability to licensees. 
If such a fundamental change in our law is otherwise desirable, it should 
more appropriately be accomplished in a case in which the issue is raised, 
in which the court has the benefit of briefs and arguments directed specifi­
cally thereto, and in which the court can better weigh and consider the far 
reaching implications and consequences of such a change. 
rd. 
93. "Historically the orderly development and evolution of the common law 
has been accomplished primarily by the judicial decision of issues actually in con­
troversy, with due consideration for the consequences of the decision, but without 
trying to anticipate and simultaneously decide all possible related questions which 
might arise later." Boston Hous. Auth., 363 Mass. at 219-20, 29 N.E.2d at 854 (Quirico, 
J., concurring and dissenting). 
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given in a pre-hearing conference under the new Massachusetts 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 94 
VI. DEVELOPING PATTERNS IN TORT REFORM 
The court in Poirier stated that "the hidden defect rule.. . 
no longer is to be applied in cases involving tort actions against 
landowners."95 This raises the question whether Poirier is to have 
full retroactive effect. The reasonable person standard may apply 
either to all court proceedings conducted after the Poirier decision 
or only to those causes of action arising after the rendering of the 
opinion. By expressly delineating the cases to which Poirier will 
apply, the court would not have objectionably expanded the scope 
of the opinion beyond the needs of the case. At the same time, this 
delineation would have avoided wasteful litigation of the retroactiv­
ity issue. 
Despite the Poirier court's failure to decide the retroactivity 
issue, a pattern has developed in the court's recent overruling de­
cisions which suggests a presumption of full retroactivity in cases 
like Poirier. This pattern suggests that when the court is willing to 
overrule a judicially created precedent, the new rule will be given 
full retroactive effect. In Bouchard v. DeGagne, 96 Pevoski v. Pev­
oski,97 and Bousquet v. Commonwealth 98 previous judicial changes 
in substantive tort law were given full retroactive effect in later 
cases. 
Retroactive application of the Poirier holding will not work any 
significant injustice on landowners because in cases potentially con­
trolled by Poirier, it is doubtful that there has been any actual re­
94. MASS. R. App. P. 21 provides, "The appellate court may direct the attorneys 
for the parties to appear before the court or a single justice for a prehearing confer­
ence to consider the simplification of the issues and such other matters as may aid in 
the disposition of the proceedings by the court." According to the Reporter's Notes, 
prior to the adoption of the new rules in 1974, this rule had no parallel in the Massa­
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 
95. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 101,372 N.E.2d at 217. 
96. 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1856, 329 N.E.2d 114 (1975). The court held that its 
elimination of the common law distinctions between licensees and invitees in 
Mounsey was to be given full retroactive effect. 
97. 76 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2624, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976). Lewis v. Lewis, 76 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1764, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976) (court's partial abrogation of interspousal im­
munity was held fully retroactive). 
98. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 263, 372 N.E.2d 257 (1978). The court gave full retroac­
tive effect to its decision to abrogate governmental immunity for the maintenance of 
a private nuisance in Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 296 
N.E.2d 461 (1973). 
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liance by landowners on the hidden defect rule. To the extent that 
some landowners have relied on the hidden defect rule, the policy 
goal of compensating work related injury outweighs that reliance 
interest. The decision should be given full retroactive effect, be­
cause the law actually did not determine the conduct of most land­
owners. 
Furthermore, the Poirier court's use of the judicial power to 
overrule indicates that it did not view the change in the common 
law as being of a magnitude which would require legislative action 
and result in only a prospective application of the new law. In 
Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth,99 the court hesitated to 
overrule the governmental immunity doctrine because it felt that 
changes of great magnitude in the common law should be made by 
the legislature. The court favored legislation which could create a 
comprehensive scheme,lOo limit liability,lOl and affect only future 
transactions102 as the best vehicle for such a drastic or radical in­
cursion into existing law. Legislative overruling of existing law can 
incorporate notice to parties effected by the change, and, thereby, 
avoid frustrating past transactions made in reliance on existing 
law. 103 The legislature, when promulgating a new rule of law, 
should indicate the statute's effective date. This would give poten­
tial litigants an opportunity to adjust their conduct in advance of 
the change. 
VII. AN EMERGING MODEL FOR PRIVATE LAw REFORM 
The rapid change in Massachusetts substantive tort law has not 
been the exclusive work of the judiciary. Examining only the over­
ruling opinions of the court ignores the important role of the legis­
lature in enacting private law reform. When recent legislative ac­
tions104 are added to judicial activism,105 both the pace and the 
99. 363 Mass. 612, 624, 296 N.E.2d 461, 468 (1973). 
100. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1713, 1718, 366 N.E.2d 
1210, 1213 (1977). 
101. Id. 
102. Colby v. Carney Hosp., 356 Mass. 527, 528,257 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1969). 
103. Diaz v. Eli Lilly and Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973). "In no 
serious way will an existing interest be impaired or an expectation be disappointed 
or a reliance be defeated .... Accordingly there is no occasion to take full precautions 
to confine our decision to prospective operation." Id. at 167,302 N.E.2d at 564 (cita­
tion omitted). 
104. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West Supp. 1978) (abol­
ished privity requirement in warranty actions); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186, § 
15E (West 1977) (the fact that defect existed in common area at time lease was exe­
556 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:537 
scope of change is accelerated. Furthermore, the recent reforms in 
substantive law have been paralleled by change in the roles of the 
two branches effecting those reforms as well as in the way these 
branches interact. An examination of the roles and types of interac­
tion between the Massachusetts court and legislature reveals that a 
new model for private law reform is emerging. 
Historically, the courts viewed their role as one in which 
judges followed precedent and restrained themselves from remak­
ing the law as it ought to be, and instead left to the legislature the 
task of improving the law. 106 The courts made new law only inter­
stitially, filling in gaps between established precedents and statut­
ory schemes. 107 The power of the court was great, but it was not a 
power to be confused with that of the legislature; it was not a 
power used to promulgate broad new rules of law. Courts exercised 
judicial restraint based on separation of powers and on the assump­
tion that necessary reforms would be made by the legislature. 
The absence of overruling decisions became the primary 
weakness in the traditional role of the Massachusetts judiciary. As 
precedents accumulated, the space available for interstitial creativity 
narrowed. lOS Correspondingly, the need for overruling decisions 
increased because accelerated change in society left many of the 
older rules outmoded. The traditional roles assigned to the 
cuted no defense to tort action if defect violated building code); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977) (authorizes tort action for defective premises if land­
lord fails to make repair within reasonable time after notice of defect); MASS. GEN. 
LAws ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (West Supp. 1978) (wrongful death damages recover­
able increased by 1973 amendment); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231B, § 1-4 (West 
Supp. 1978) (Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act adopted); MASS. GEN. 
LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1978) (comparative negligence adopted ab­
rogating defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence); MASS. GEN. 
LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85G (West Supp. 1978) (created limited liability for parents of 
minor children who cause injury by willful act); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 
85K (West Supp. 1978) (abolished charitable immunity); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 
231, § 85L (West Supp. 1978) (motor vehicle operator's guest may recover for ordi­
nary negligence); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85M (West Supp. 1978) (dis­
claimers of liability by parking facilities not a defense to tort or contract claim); 
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85Q (West Supp. 1978) (landowners liable to tres­
passing children if they maintain attractive nuisance); 1978 Mass. Legis. Servo 792 
(West) (to be codified as MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258) (abolished the defense of 
governmental immunity). 
105. See note 78 supra. 
106. Leflar, Taught Law is Tough Law, 8 WAYNE L.R. 465, 478 (1962). But see 
note 81 supra. 
107. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 15 (1966). 
108. R. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE 16 (1969). 
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judiciary and legislature required the legislature to enact needed 
reform.I09 The legislature, however, has inherent institutional limi­
tations llO which often prevent it from directing its attention to tort 
law reform. The legislature's ability to enact needed tort law re­
. form is limited by inertia and lack of time. Until recently, no or­
ganized interest group lobbied to urge the legislature to act to 
bring about changes in the rights and duties which private indi­
viduals owe to each other. lll By assigning the responsibility for 
reform to the legislature, the traditional model diminished the 
likelihood that reform would occur. 
The role of the judiciary had to change if the court was to 
discharge its overall public duty to make the law responsive to the 
society it serves. Because legislative inaction seemed certain and 
the need for reform was compelling, the court began to overrule its 
own precedents. Thus, the court evolved from merely a precedent 
creating institution into a precedent overruling institution. Under 
this intermediate model, the court made new law, if necessary, by 
overruling its own precedents, but only in areas traditionally re­
served to the court. Other areas requiring a comprehensive scheme 
109. Id. 

llO. Id. at 16-17. 

The legislatures of the present day do not approach those of fifty years 
ago in their capacity to make considered decisions on proposals for law re­
form, wherever the proposals may have originated. Today, in state after 
state, the reported experience of those close to the legislative process is that 
inertia and lack of time are major factors detem'lining what bills are enacted 
and what bills fall by the wayside .... 
That so few law reform bills are passed is not a weakness to be charged 
against legislators. Rather, it is an institutional limitation to be taken into 
account when we attempt to appraise realistically the potentiality for law 
reform of a modem state legislature. Only the most compelling needs are 
likely to capture its attention. In these circumstances, the aphorism that a 
legislature's failure to enact a change is an expression of approval of the law 
as it stands is a patent fallacy. Year after year the legislators fail to act on 
proposals for reform concerning which the majority of them individually 
have no view. Among these, no doubt, are proposals they would favor if 
their time and attention could be devoted to reaching considered judgments 
on the merits. 
We cannot expect any improvement in this respect. In view of the con­
tinuing rise of other demands upon the legislator's limited time and ener­
gies, we must expect that the inherent institutional limitations upon the po­
tentiality of state legislatures for reforming the law will be manifested even 
more severely in the future. 
lli. Law journal contributors, bent on reform, and numerous law professors 
have probably done more to convey the need for private law reform in the tort field 
than any other group. Id. at 13. 
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of reform were deemed unfit for judicial modification, and re­
mained the exclusive province of the legislative branch. While this 
intermediate model allowed reform in the "judicial areas," the 
same legislative limitations, inertia and lack of time, still prevented 
reform in the areas of law reserved for the legislature. 
This lingering barrier to effective tort reform in all areas has 
been largely overcome by a new model for interaction between the 
judiciary and the legislature. The traditional roles have expanded to 
allow action by one branch to help overcome the inertia existing in 
the other branch. Thus, one branch can help affect a change in an 
area of law concededly in the other's bailiwick, but in need of re­
form. In short, each branch now perceives its role as one which 
encompasses not only making substantive change within its area of 
competence, but also prompting the other institution into action 
when it feels a substantive change is warranted. It is this prompt­
ing function that distinguishes the institutional interaction in the 
emerging model for tort law reform from the traditional separate 
spheres of action model. 
This new type of judicial-legislative interaction was demon­
strated when the court chose to prompt the legislature to enact 
reform, rather than use the judicial power to abolish the doctrine 
of governmental immunity.112 Abrogating governmental immunity 
represents a major change in the common law. The court chose not 
to abolish the doctrine because they could not, within a single 
case, enact a comprehensive limited liability scheme. 
In a series of four governmental immunity cases, 113 the 
judiciary deferred to the legislature but urged the abolition of the 
doctrine. Finally, in Whitney v. City of Worcester,114 the court 
issued this ultimatum to the legislature: 
Accordingly, we state our intention to abrogate the doctrine of . 
. . [governmental] immunity in the 6rst appropriate case decided 
by this court after the conclusion of the next (1978) session of the 
Legislature, provided that the Legislature at that time has not 
itself acted de6nitively as to the doctrine. us 
112. E.g., Morash, 363 Mass. at 612, 296 N.E.2d at 461. 
113. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1713, 366 N.E.2d 1210 
(1977); Caine v. Commonwealth, 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2990, 335 N.E.2d 340 (1975); 
Hannigan v. New Gamma-Delta Chapter of Kappa Sigma Fraternity, Inc., 75 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1416, 327 N.E.2d 882 (1975); Morash, 363 Mass. at 612, 296 N.E.2d at 461. 
114. 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1713,366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977). 
115. [d. at 1715,366 N.E.2d at 1212. 
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Further, the court expressed its intention to give retroactive effect 
to its overruling opinion, despite potentially disastrous fiscal conse­
quences for governmental units. 116 Thus, the court, while reluctant 
to change the law, exerted substantial pressure on the legislature to 
enact this tort law reform. 117 The court had found the judicially 
created common law rule "logically indefensible," but had ab­
stained from overruling. 118 In sweeping dicta, the court outlined 
the major principles which it feft should be adopted,119 along with 
a deadline for legislative action. The legislature complied by 
abolishing governmental immunity in the closing days of the 1978 
session. 12o The new statute adopted the general principles the 
court had outlined in Whitney. 121 
116. In Whitney, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1736, 366 N.E.2d at 1219-20, the court 
stated that after its opinion in Morash, any further reliance on the immunity doctrine 
was misplaced. Therefore, if the court was forced to overrule the doctrine, it would 
allow recovery for all injuries occurring since the publication of Morash on May 13, 
1973. ld. at 1735, 366 N.E.2d at 1219-20 (1977). 
117. Over four years had elapsed between the court's first suggestion in Mor­
ash that the legislature abolish governmental immunity and Whitney. The court 
followed a similar pattern in abolishing charitable immunity. 
In Colby v. Carney Hosp., 356 Mass. 527, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1969), the court 
warned, "It seems likely that no legislative action in this Commonwealth is probable 
in the near future. Accordingly, we take this occasion to give adequate warning that 
the next time we are squarely confronted by a legal question respecting the charita­
ble immunity doctrine it is our intention to abolish it." ld. at 528, 254 N.E.2d at 408. 
The legislature abolished the doctrine by statute. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 
85K (West Supp. 1978). 
118. 363 Mass. at 619-20,296 N.E.2d at 465-66. 
119. 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1713, 366 N.E.2d at 1210. 
Should it become necessary for us to bring change by judicial action we will 
at that time embark on the task of restructuring our law of governmental tort 
liability to bring it into conformity with reason and sound public policy. 
Therefore, we think it a useful exercise for this court to state now the major 
principles which we intend to recognize if and when it becomes necessary 
for us so to restructure the common law. 
ld. at 1717-18, 366 N.E.2d at 1213. 
120. 1978 Mass. Legis. Servo 792 (West) (to be codified as MASS. GEN. LAws 
ANN. ch. 258). 
121. Compare Whitney with MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258 (West Supp. 
1978). The court invited the legislature to adopt their scheme by stating: 
In suggesting such limits of liability we have no wish to intrude on the 
prerogatives of the Legislature. Nevertheless, we are cognizant that the 
Legislature may wish to enact a comprehensive legislative scheme in place 
of the formulation we present herein. With respect to any action the Legisla­
ture may take, the principles which we express in this opinion only suggest 
the balance of equities we think sound. We hope, of course, that the princi­
ples we stress here will aid the Legislature in its deliberations. 
77 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1718, 366 N.E.2d at 1213. 
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In Whitney, the court interacted with the legislature in a new 
way. If the legislature had not enacted the statute, the court 
threatened to give retroactive effect to its abolition of the immu­
nity. This would have exposed Massachusetts and its political sub­
divisions to millions of dollars in unanticipated tort liability. The 
court, by exerting substantial pressure for change, successfully 
overcame the legislative inertia. A willingness by the court to goad 
or directly prompt action in the legislative branch represents a new 
type of institutional interaction. In Whitney, the court, by pressing 
for legislative change, may have transgressed the traditional limits 
of the judiciary. Expressly avowed intentions to abrogate rules in 
the next appropriate case may, however, be justified as necessary 
to overcome the legislature's failure to act. In any event, the Whit­
ney scenario--judicial pronouncement resulting in direct legislative 
response--demonstrates that, in revising tort liability, the court's 
activist role has had an impact beyond the traditional judicial 
sphere. The new model allows the court to act as a catalyst for 
legislative reform. 
Just as the court has begun to prompt the legislature to act, 
the legislature has, in some areas, prompted long overdue reform 
in areas traditionally reserved to the judiciary. Despite the legisla­
ture's inability to fully re-examine these areas and enact necessary 
reforms, statutes have been enacted which overcome the court's 
reluctance to break with precedent. Even an activist court may 
avoid certain reforms because of judicial inertia stemming from 
crowded dockets or the lack of an appropriate case as a vehicle for 
reform. 
As late as 1970,122 for example, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld the privity of contract requirement in war­
ranty actions notwithstanding the general recognition123 by other 
jurisdictions that breach of warranty more closely resembles a tort 
action rather than a contract claim. 124 The legislature reacted by 
amending the Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code to elimi­
122. Necktas v. General Motors Corp., Pontiac Div., 357 Mass. 546, 259 N.E.2d 
234 (1970) (Siegal, J., dissenting, with whom Kirk, J., joins). 
123. See generally Note, Products Liability: Tort or Contract-A Resolution of 
the Conflict? 21 N.Y.L.F. 587 (1976). 
124. Since Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946), privity 
of contract between manufacturer and purchaser was not an essential element in a 
negligence case. Therefore, it seems anomalous that the court maintained the privity 
requirement in warranty cases. 
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nate the privity requirement. 125 The court responded in Hoffman 
v. Howmedica, Inc., 126 by dismissing the defendant's strong argu­
ment that the legislature's amendment did not apply to plaintiff's 
cause of action and construing the statute to allow recovery. This 
decision indicates the court's willingness to respond to legislative 
prompting. 
Another example of the legislature acting as a catalyst to judi­
cial reform is the recognition of the right to privacy as an action­
able tort in Massachusetts. Although the issue was presented 
numerous times, the court failed to recognize the existence of an 
actionable tort for invasion of privacy.127 The legislature passed a 
general statute recognizing the right of privacy and allowing money 
damages for invasions of the right. 128 Much room for judicial in­
terpretation remained, however, because the legislature did not at­
tempt to define the individual interests the statute was intended to 
protect. Apparently, the legislature did not feel competent to 
supervise the development of this area of the law, but intended 
125. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West Supp. 1978). 
126. 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1488, 364 N.E.2d 1215 (1977). The court found the 
legislature's intent in amending the statute was to expand the class of plaintiffs who 
may claim the protection of an action based on warranty. [d. at 1492 n.4, 364 N.E.2d 
at 1217 n.4. Similarly, in Wolf v. Ford Motor Co., 78 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 550, 
376 N.E.2d 143 (1978), the appellate court held that, for statutory purposes, the 
buyer's niece was a member of the buyer's family. The statutory amendment was 
broadly construed because of the legislature's intent to liberalize the technical rules 
of privity. [d. at 562-63, 376 N.E.2d at 149. 
127. Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969). There 
is disagreement whether this case recognized a cause of action for violation of the 
right to privacy. In Note, The Massachusetts Right of Privacy Statute: Decoy or Ugly 
Duckling? 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1248 (1975), it was asserted that the court had rec­
ognized such a right. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit stated, "Commonwealth v. Wiseman, ... which plaintiff claims 'fully recogn­
zed' a common law right of privacy in Massachusetts, expressly refrained from decid­
ing the question of tort liability and instead permitted only equitable relief." Martin 
v. De Silva, 566 F.2d 360, 361 n.5 (1st CiT. 1977) (citation omitted). Earlier cases 
failing to recognize a right of privacy include Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 351 
Mass. 53, 217 N.E.2d 736 (1966); Frick v. Boyd, 350 Mass. 259, 214 N.E.2d 460 
(1966); Kelly v. Post Pub. Co., 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951); Themo v. New 
England Newspaper Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753 (1940); Marek v. Zanol 
Prods. Co., 298 Mass. 1, 9 N.E.2d 393 (1937); Thayer v. Worcester Post Co., 284 
Mass. 160, 187 N.E. 292 (1933); Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599,97 N.E. 109 (1912). 
128. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 1B (West Supp. 1978), is a broadly 
worded statute which reads as follows: "A person shall have a right against unrea­
sonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy. The superior court shall 
have jurisdiction in equity to enforce such right and in connection therewith to 
award damages." 
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that the court recognize the right. 129 
Enactment of the privacy statute and the elimination of the 
privity requirement in warranty actions represent independent ac­
tions by the legislature that created needed tort reform. These stat­
utes are, therefore, useful devices in overcoming the inertia that 
exists in the judicial branch. The legislature has interacted in a new 
way with the judiciary by requiring the court, in selected areas, to 
increase its private law reform activity. 
Just as the common law adapts to the society it serves, the 
processes by which the institutions responsible for law reform 
interact also must change. Otherwise, the institutions may fail to 
discharge their current responsibilities to society.130 A principle 
underlying the development of the respective roles of courts and 
legislatures is that each branch is to effect those reforms for which 
its processes are better suited. 131 There can be little doubt that the 
court is the proper body to develop, on a case by case basis, the 
right of privacy, and that the legislature is better suited to abolish 
governmental immunity with a comprehensive statutory scheme. In 
addition to reforming tort law in their respective areas, both the 
legislature and the court have successfully prompted reform activity 
in the other branch. Thus, the historic allocation of power and re­
sponsibility for law reform in the tort field has evolved into a new 
model. 
The problem of one branch of government overreaching the 
other is minimal when pressure for law reform is based on institu­
tional self-restraint. The judiciary never doubted its power to abro­
gate governmental immunity but, instead, restrained itself to en­
able the legislature to enact a sensible, comprehensive scheme. 
Similarly, the legislature refrained from enacting a comprehen­
sive right of privacy statute because it felt that the case by case 
approach was a superior vehicle for developing this area of the 
law. Thus, both institutions have deferred to the other in certain 
areas where the other institution was better suited to make the 
desired change. This deference, a new form of self-restraint, is 
largely responsible for the emergence of the new model for tort law 
reform in Massachusetts. 
129. The language of the statute is "so general that the scope of the tort of 
invasion of privacy in Massachusetts is, as it was before the statute, a matter of judi­
ciallaw." [d. at Comment-1973. 
130. R. KEETON, supra note 108, at 17. 
131. [d. at 17-18. 
563 1979] 	 TORT LAW REFORM 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Poirier cures an injustice by allowing employees of indepen­
dent contractors recovery against landowners without requiring 
proof of the existence of a hidden defect. Landowners are now sub­
ject to liability when they fail to exercise reasonable care in main­
taining premises or alerting an employee of actual or potential 
hazards. Increased liability creates an additional cost incentive 
which should reduce the number of accidents. Through insurance, 
the costs of accidents which do occur will be spread over a larger 
number of individuals. 
During the last decade, judicial activism combined with legis­
lative action has accelerated the rate of substantive tort reform in 
Massachusetts. Much of the judicial reform, however, has resulted 
from opinions whose scope far exceeds the needs of the case at bar. 
The scope of overruling opinions should be limited by the facts 
b~fore the court. The court should make more extensive use of 
procedures which will guarantee counsel an adequate opportunity 
to press policy against precedent whenever the court feels com­
pelled to question existing law. 
All of the judicial changes in substantive tort law have eventu­
ally been given full retroactive effect. By ruling on the issue of 
retroactivity in the same opinion that overrules prior case law, the 
court would avoid needless litigation of this issue. Express delinea­
tion of those causes of action which are affected by judicial tort 
reforms should facilitate negotiated settlement of many claims. 
The emerging model for tort law reform incorporates a 
prompting function not found in the traditional institutional interac­
tion between court and legislature. This new model allows both the 
court and legislature to overcome the inertia existing in the other 
branch. This prompting role must, however, continue to be exer­
cised cautiously to maintain the separation of powers. Carefully 
used, the added dimension of the prompting function should result 
in 	more efficient private law reform in Massachusetts. 
Richard P. Boehmer 
